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Abstract. This paper builds on contributions to a Conference on Benefit-Cost Analysis of 
Financial Regulation, held at the University of Chicago, to show how benefit-cost analysis 
(BCA) of financial regulations should be conducted. Our major themes are that (1) on theoretical 
grounds, BCA should be easier for financial regulation than for other areas of regulation where it 
is already used, such as health and safety regulation; (2) while many needed valuations for BCA 
of financial regulation do not yet exist, those valuations are theoretically measurable; (3) once 
regulators commit to using BCA, economists will have incentives to work on supplying those 
valuations; (4) BCA will improve financial regulation and make it less vulnerable to judicial 
challenge; and (5) the specific protocols or paradigms of BCA will differ across different areas 





 Nearly all U.S. regulatory agencies use benefit-cost analysis (BCA) to evaluate proposed 
regulations. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, uses BCA to evaluate 
regulations that require factories to reduce emissions. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) uses BCA to evaluate regulations that require workplaces to install 
safety devices for workers. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) uses 
BCA to evaluate fuel economy standards. Yet a striking exception to this pattern occurs in the 
area of financial regulation. The major agencies with jurisdiction over financial activities—
including the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), and the Federal Reserve Board—have almost never used formal BCA to 
evaluate financial regulations. 
 
 Yet there is no reason to believe that BCA would be appropriate for environmental or 
workplace regulation and not for financial regulation. Indeed, BCA would seem more 
appropriate for financial regulation where data are better and more reliable, and where regulators 
do not confront ideologically charged valuation problems like those concerning mortality risk 
and environmental harm. The benefits and costs of financial regulation are commensurable 
monetary gains and losses, and so can be easily compared.  This does not mean the burden of 
proving benefits exceed costs should lie exclusively or even primarily with regulators as opposed 
to the regulated; burdens should be based on a broader assessment of where benefits and costs 
will tend to lie.  For example, we (Posner and Weyl, 2013c) have advocated pre-approval 
1 Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School, and Assistant Professor of 
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regulation of new financial derivatives that would place burdens of proving the benefits of 
innovation on the proposing party. 
 
 EPA and the other agencies have been using BCA since 1981, when President Reagan 
ordered all regulatory agencies to use BCA for major regulations—those with a yearly economic 
impact of at least $100 million. President Reagan’s order excluded the so-called independent 
agencies, including most of the financial agencies. Over the last 30 years, the agencies that use 
BCA have obtained considerable experience in the methodology, and have refined their 
techniques and adopted consistent assumptions, under the guidance of the OMB and particularly 
OIRA. Over time, useful protocols have been developed. Consultancies in the private sector have 
grown up to provide institutional support to these analyses through subcontracting. The agencies 
perform and report their BCAs for all major regulations, which enables academics and other 
outsiders to offer criticism and suggestions for improvement. While BCAs today are far from 
perfect, they are fairly sophisticated and useful exercises. EPA’s recent climate regulations, for 
example, depend on sophisticated computer modeling of the climate to provide a basis for 
projections of the economic harm from climate change. 
 
 By contrast, the financial regulatory agencies have not developed protocols for evaluating 
financial regulations. While they do provide explanations, as are required by law, and these 
explanations often involve economic analysis of some sort, there has been no rigorous effort to 
compare benefits and costs, at least publicly. It may well be that they use models internally, but 
there is no evidence that they use benefit-cost analysis. 
 
 The reason that the non-financial regulators issued BCAs, while the financial regulators 
generally have not, is that all presidents since Reagan have required only non-financial regulators 
to issue BCAs, possibly because their legal authority to boss around independent agencies is 
ambiguous. (The one major exception is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which is 
an office in the non-independent Treasury.) In principle, a president can fire the head of the EPA 
if she refused to perform BCAs, while he has no such authority over the chair of the SEC. 
Meanwhile, agencies were rarely understood to be legally required to perform BCAs, so 
regulated entities were rarely able to persuade courts to strike down regulations that failed BCAs. 
Courts generally require agencies to perform a rigorous analysis of the potential effects of 
regulations, but not to perform a BCA. 
 
 But in recent years this has changed. In a number of cases, the D.C. Circuit has made 
clear that it expects financial regulatory agencies to perform BCAs for some of their regulations, 
and that it will strike down regulations that fail BCAs, at least under certain conditions. The 
financial regulatory agencies have scrambled to develop protocols that would enable them to 
perform high-quality BCAs. But so far they have failed to develop such protocols. The academic 
literature on BCA focuses on non-financial regulations, and so has been no help. And while the 
general principles of BCA apply to all types of regulation, there are distinctive valuation 
problems that arise in financial regulation that do not arise in other areas of regulation. As a 
result, the financial regulatory agencies face a risky and hostile legal environment even as they 




 The purpose of the paper is to draw on the work of the participants at a conference on 
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Financial Regulation, held at the University of Chicago in October 
2013, to outline how financial regulatory agencies should perform BCA for financial regulations. 
On the cost side, regulators must estimate the administrative and opportunity costs of compliance 
for firms, as well as reductions in markets’ ability to supply services valued by the economy. The 
former is usually relatively straightforward to compute, though the latter may be more 
challenging. In particular, financial firms supply information, insurance products and consumer 
credit that are valued by consumers in ways that may be difficult to measure. Three of the panels 
in the conference investigated these costs and, as discussed below, generally found evidence that 
they are smaller than might have been thought. As a result, we suggest a paradigm under which 
the primary costs of regulation are those directly to firm profits. 
 
We argue that the benefits of financial regulation lie primarily in reducing bailout costs to 
the public (and creditors), lowering the chance of a systemic crisis, reducing other harmful 
speculative activity, and avoiding wasteful racing for information. In specific areas of policy, a 
subset of these benefits is likely to be focal and others less central or harder to quantify. For 
example, in regulation of banks and other systemically important financial institutions the first 
two benefits are crucial while the others are harder to measure, and so should be generally 
ignored unless strong evidence can be brought to bear. Based on this view, we provide an outline 




A. Benefit-Cost Analysis in U.S. Government Regulation 
 
 BCA is a method for evaluating a project or regulation based on economic principles. 
Typically, the regulator considers a range of regulations and calculates the benefits and costs of 
each. The cost is the financial cost of complying with the regulation, which may involve buying 
and installing new equipment like scrubbers, hiring workers to perform tasks like cleaning up 
spills, or reducing production. Benefits are usually avoided costs for specific third parties or for 
the general public—for example, the avoided cost of medical treatment, avoided mortality, 
avoided harm to property caused by pollution, and so on. The benefits and costs are discounted 
to present value. A regulation should be approved only if the benefits exceed the costs, and 
ideally the regulation with the best benefit/cost ratio should be chosen. 
 
 Before 1981, U.S. regulatory agencies used BCA sporadically, mainly for construction 
projects and occasionally for environmental regulations. It is not entirely clear how regulators 
evaluated regulations when they did not use BCA. Most likely, they relied on rough intuitions 
about benefits and harms, while avoiding extreme outcomes that could result in significant 
economic disruption like factory closings. One common approach, known as feasibility analysis, 
required agencies to adopt the strictest regulation that did not cause excessive job loss (Masur 
and Posner, 2010). After President Reagan’s executive order in 1981, most regulatory agencies 
(excluding independent agencies like most of the financial regulatory agencies) began to use 
BCA for major regulations. Despite the initial widespread hostility to Reagan’s order, all 




 Under the executive orders of Reagan and his successors, agencies perform BCAs and 
submit them to OIRA, an office in OMB. OIRA was directed to return the regulations to 
agencies if the BCA was poorly conducted or showed that the regulation was not cost-justified. 
There is a great deal of controversy over whether OIRA really did block inefficient regulations 
or not (Hahn & Dudley 2006). A few statutes also have been interpreted to require agencies to 
conduct BCAs; if they fail to, the regulation may be rejected by a court.2 
 
B. Financial Regulation 
 
1. Financial Regulation Before Business Roundtable 
 
 As noted above, financial regulations are not subject to OIRA review, with the important 
exception of the OCC. Financial regulations are subject to judicial review, but traditionally 
judicial review of financial regulation has been exceptionally deferential.3 One of the core 
functions of the regulatory agencies is to set minimum capital requirements for financial 
institutions. Getting these requirements right is extremely important: if they are too strict, they 
may stymie lending and economic growth; if they are too weak, they allow banks to take on too 
much risk, which can lead to a financial crisis. Yet there has been hardly any judicial review of 
minimum capital regulations. Very few cases exist, probably because banks need to maintain 
good relations with regulators, and so prefer not to challenge their orders in court. 
 
 One notable example of judicial review took place in the case, First National Bank of 
Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency (697 F.2d 674 [1983]). After conducting several 
examinations of the Bank, the Comptroller determined that the Bank was insufficiently 
capitalized, and ordered it to raise capital. The Comptroller’s expert had conducted a qualitative 
analysis and quantitative analysis. The qualitative analysis found that the Bank’s assets, earnings, 
liquidity, and management to be “basically strong.” The quantitative analysis revealed that the 
Bank’s capital-adequacy ratio was 5.28 percent, which was below the 7.0 percent that the expert 
believed appropriate, and that it was near the bottom of the Bank’s peer group (First National 
Bank, 697 F.2d at 685-686). However, the Court held that this did not prove that the Bank’s 
operations were unsafe or unsound. An expert witness for the Bank testified that a safe capital-
asset ratio could be as low as 4 percent. And the Court found it relevant that the ratio for all 
banks in 1979 was 5.45 percent, and that a higher ratio prevailed in the 1930s when numerous 
banks failed. The Court concluded that the Comptroller’s order was arbitrary and capricious 
under the APA. 
 
 The Court did not give serious consideration to whether the 7.0 percent target level was 
reasonable; it did not address the costs or the benefits of higher capital requirements. But nor did 
the Comptroller. There was simply no way to evaluate the Comptroller’s reasoning; and perhaps 
that is why the court vacated the order. 
 
 In response to the Bellaire decision, Congress enacted the International Lending 
Supervision Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C. § 3907), which provided that the determination of capital 
requirements lies in bank regulators’ discretion. Congress made clear that it intended to eliminate 
2 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA (947 F.2d 1201 [1991]) for the classic case. 
3 For background, see Conroy 1995; Bartlett (this issue); Gordon (this issue). 
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judicial review of regulators’ capital adequacy determinations, and in FDIC v. Coushatta (930 
F.2d 1122 [1991]), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit so held. In that case, the FDIC had 
ordered another bank to raise capital, and the Court rejected the bank’s arguments that the order 
was arbitrary and capricious, holding that the ILSA’s grant of discretion to regulatory agencies 
superseded the normal arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA. 
 
 In a later case, Frontier State Bank Oklahoma City v. FDIC (702 F.3d 588, 596-97 
[2012]), a Court explained why judges should not second-guess regulators’ determinations of 
capital requirements. “The amount of capital a bank needs to weather uncertainty is a subjective 
judgment dependent on an informed analysis of the magnitude and likelihood of the attendant 
risks…. Reasonable minds will differ as to appropriate capital levels because they reasonably 
differ on their assessment of the attendant risks.” The Court evidently believed that regulators 
rely on intuition or hidden factors that they could not be expected to articulate in an objective 
fashion. 
 
 As a result, regulatory agencies have not needed to worry that courts will reject capital 
adequacy regulations under the APA. As an example, in 1985 the FDIC issued capital adequacy 
regulations that raised the minimum capital-assets ratio to 6 percent for primary capital and 5.5 
percent for total capital (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Capital Maintenance, 50 FR 
11128-01 (1985)). The FDIC gave a number of general reasons, arguing that risk in the banking 
system had increased in recent years as a result of the deregulation of interest rates, competition 
to supply financial services had intensified, bank profits had declined, and various economic 
shocks had struck. It did not estimate the compliance costs for banks, or the benefits for the 
economy from the reduction of bank risk. Thus, it gave no reasons why the ratios should be 6 
and 5.5 percent rather than 6.5 and 6 percent, or any other pair of numbers. 
 
 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, unlike the other financial regulators, is a 
regular agency, not independent, and thus it must perform BCAs. But its BCAs are wholly 
inadequate. In 2008, it issued revisions of its capital adequacy regulations along with an 
accompanying BCA that failed to quantify any of the expected benefits of the regulation. And 
while it did quantify the trivial administrative costs to banks of implementing the regulations, it 
ignored the much larger opportunity costs (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 2008). 
 
2. The Business Roundtable Decision 
 
 In Business Roundtable, an industry group challenged the SEC’s rule 14a-11, known as 
the proxy access rule. Rule 14a-11 required that prior to board elections, public corporations 
must place on the proxy statement a limited number of candidates for director positions 
nominated by certain large shareholders. The purpose of rule 14a-11 was to loosen 
management’s control over the firm’s directors. Shareholders are generally permitted to 
nominate directors, but without proxy access they typically face insurmountable costs to 
informing other shareholders of their nominations. With proxy access, these costs are reduced, 
creating a realistic possibility that outsiders can challenge management-nominated directors, and 
thus impose some discipline on management.4 
 
4 For helpful background on the rule, see Fisch 2013. 
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 There is no question that the SEC possessed the legal authority to issue this rule, both 
under older statutes and under the Dodd-Frank Act. The D.C. Circuit struck down the rule 
because it was “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act, based on the 
SEC’s failure to consider the rule’s effect on “efficiency, competition, and capital formation,” as 
required by the Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act of 1940.5 
 
 The Court objected to the SEC’s failure to justify Rule 14a-11 with a rigorous cost-
benefit analysis. The SEC justified the rule based on its expectation that the rule would reduce 
the cost to shareholders of nominating and electing their own directors by allowing them to avoid 
some of the costs of printing and postage that would be necessary in normal proxy contests. This 
cost reduction would in turn improve board performance, and hence corporate performance, by 
raising the probability that a poorly performing board will be replaced. On the cost side, the SEC 
acknowledged that the corporation would incur additional disclosure, printing, and mailing costs; 
and that management could be distracted by challenges from disgruntled shareholders. Without 
estimating the monetary value of these benefits and the costs, the SEC concluded that the rule 
was cost-justified. 
 
 The Court rejected the cost-benefit analysis because the benefits and costs were not 
monetized, and the SEC failed to provide a justification for the failure to monetize costs and 
benefits. It also made a number of specific criticisms. The SEC had discounted the claims that 
companies would incur costs opposing shareholder-nominated candidates because bad-faith 
opposition would violate the director’s fiduciary duties, but in doing so it failed to consider that 
some shareholder-nominated candidates might be worse than the board’s candidates, in which 
case the board would be required to oppose them. The SEC also claimed that the cost of the rule 
would be low because elections would be infrequent, but failed to recognize that therefore the 
benefits would be low.6 The SEC selectively cited empirical studies that supported the proxy 
access rule and discounted studies that suggested it would not be cost-justified. The SEC refused 
to consider commenters’ argument that the rule would enable union and state pension funds to 
gain concessions by threatening boards with candidates who would act in the interests of unions 
and pension funds rather than shareholders as a whole. The SEC’s estimate of the number of 
election contests was internally inconsistent. And the SEC refused to consider special factors 
involved in the application of the rule to investment companies. 
 
 Legal commentators have criticized the opinion.7 Many of the complaints center on 
whether the Court acted consistently with legal precedent, but the focus of the criticism is that 
the Court put an excessive burden on the SEC—a burden so large that it will hardly ever be able 
to issue regulations. There are already so many bureaucratic and legal hurdles faced by the SEC 
that it simply cannot issue many regulations that are in the public interest.8 Accordingly, it 
focuses on the low-hanging fruit and thus there is good reason to believe that the regulations it 
5 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 80a-2(c) (1934). 
6 Id. The Court does not discuss the possibility that once directors believe that they can be replaced, their 
performance will improve, so that shareholders will not challenge them with outside nominations. But the SEC does 
not appear to have considered this possibility, either. 
7 See, e.g., Hayden & Bodie 2012. Coates 28 & n.109 (2014) summarizes the response and cites the literature. 
8 See Fisch 2013 for description of these hurdles. 
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does issue are presumptively in the public interest. The Court’s standard imposes additional 
requirements that would make such regulation impossible. 
 
 These pragmatic arguments are understandable, and even proponents of BCA need to 
recognize that if it is excessively costly to perform a BCA, then agencies should not be required 
to use it, or should be permitted to use a summary version that minimizes decision costs. To see 
why, assume that an agency can improve a BCA by doing additional data collection and analysis, 
and that as the investment in the BCA increases, the marginal benefits (in the form of accuracy) 
decline, as is surely the case. If a Court demands excessively good BCAs, then agencies will run 
out of resources without being able to regulate, even though a less than perfect BCA may still 
produce an acceptable level of error. The complaint against Business Roundtable is that it 
imposes excessively high standards, apparently confirmed by a subsequent event study that 
suggests that the proxy access rule was in fact socially beneficial (Becker et al. 2012). 
 
 The problem with this argument is that the SEC’s analysis was in fact extremely crude. 
Although some of the Court’s criticisms were unfair, the bottom line is that the SEC did not 
monetize the expected benefits and costs of the rule, and therefore had no basis for claiming that 
the rule complied with a benefit-cost analysis, and hence served the public interest. Rather than 
criticize the D.C. Circuit for striking down the proxy-access rule, and assert that it should not 
have required the SEC to comply with a BCA, we argue that the SEC should rise to the challenge 
posed by the Court, and offer BCAs that would survive judicial scrutiny. 
 
Business Roundtable does not spell the end of all financial regulation. As we have seen, 
much financial regulation—including capital-asset regulation—does not fall under the APA’s 
arbitrary and capricious standard, and so is not governed by that case. But certainly a large 
portion of financial regulation is at risk. And even more could be subject to BCA if a proposed 
bill were enacted by Congress.9 Moreover, there are good reasons for financial regulators to use 




C. The Case for BCA 
 
 The debate about BCA has raged for decades. In the 1970s, economists debated whether 
BCA reliably advances a correct moral principle like the Pareto efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency, or a suitable social welfare function. After President Reagan’s executive order, the 
debate was taken up by policy analysts and law professors. We can only provide a brief summary 
of the case for BCA in the space allotted to us. 
 
 BCA is a decision-procedure, which is justified if and only if its use by regulators 
advances the public good, however defined (Adler & Posner 2006) Early research pointed out 
that BCA does not systematically advance Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, but this 
work was largely beside the point. The relevant question is (1) whether some other decision-
procedure would work better at advancing (2) the relevant public good. 
 
9 Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2013, which was cosponsored by Senators Crapo and Shelby. 
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 Early researches rarely defined what that other decision-procedure would be. But if one 
looks at what agencies actually did, one saw two basic approaches. The first, which might be 
called “intuitive balancing,” involved weighing, in a non-rigorous way, the likely positive and 
negative effects of a regulation, without using valuations, much as an ordinary person might 
evaluate the morality of a proposed course of action. The second was the more formal but still 
somewhat vague “feasibility analysis,” where the agency adopted the strictest regulation 
consistent with avoiding excessive job loss, where “excessive” was left undefined. 
 
 BCA is superior to intuitive balancing because measuring and quantifying possible 
outcomes is superior to not measuring those outcomes. A regulator will simply have no idea how 
much harm a pollutant does to people’s lungs, or how much harm a higher price for automobiles 
will harm consumers, unless it measures these effects. Nor will the regulator be able to balance 
in a rigorous way unless the outcomes are put on a common metric. BCA uses money as that 
metric. BCA is superior to feasibility analysis because feasibility analysis excludes morally 
relevant effects of regulations, such as the harm to consumers through higher prices. Moreover, 
feasibility analysis is arbitrary because it does not specify the threshold at which job loss is 
tolerable or intolerable. 
 
 Critics of BCA argued in reply that (1) many outcomes (like death, or environmental 
damage) cannot be given monetary values; (2) the money metric distorts evaluations by giving 
excessive influence to the wealthy; and (3) BCA assumes a utilitarian social welfare function, 
which is not a plausible representation of the common good. 
 
 None of these arguments have prevailed in public debates. Economists have developed a 
number of admittedly imperfect ways for valuing outcomes that are not normally monetized. 
They seem to be good enough. While it is true that the money metric distorts evaluations, the 
distortion is likely to be small for most regulations; it can be (and sometimes is) corrected by 
adjusting valuations (as is done with valuation of mortality risk); and if outcomes systematically 
harm the poor, redistribution can correct for this. And while BCA does assume a utilitarian social 
welfare function and ignores deontological constraints that play an important role in public 
morality, it is simply a tool for enabling the government to accomplish the uncontroversial task 
of promoting the common good, which seems to be a roughly utilitarian (or welfarist) goal. 
Where BCA deviates from public morality (for example, in incorporating anti-social 
preferences), it can be corrected. 
 
 In addition to this general defense of BCA, defenders have pointed out a number of 
second-order advantages. 
 
Transparency. BCA enhances transparency by forcing agencies to clearly specify the 
empirical basis of their regulations. Principals can verify the BCA by obtaining the information 
on which the agency relied—typically from public sources or independent contractors who 
conducted surveys. This makes it difficult for agencies to issue regulations on ideological, 
political, or other improper grounds. 
 
Limiting gaming. When regulators issue rules that do not reflect a BCA evaluation, it is 
sometimes hard to understand what goal those rules advance. This makes it easy for regulated 
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entities to “game” the rules: to take actions that violate the spirit while complying with the letter. 
Rules are harder to circumvent when the justification behind them is clear. If a rule is justified 
clearly by BCA principles, then regulators can respond flexibly to gaming by updating the rule, 
using interpretive guidance documents, so that it more fully embodies the underlying 
justification. 
 
Consistency across regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies often have overlapping 
jurisdictions, and so a risk arises that they may regulate firms inconsistently. While they can and 
do coordinate with each other, coordination is not always easy. This seems to be a major problem 
now in the way CFTC and SEC treat differently the threats from high speed trading and 
speculation. Similarly, OCC and FDIC have different and conflicting emphases on the 
importance of traditional prudential regulation versus addressing systemic risk. As Cochrane 
(this issue) emphasizes, one of the worst problems with regulation thus far has been this 
inconsistency. Each agency has promoted its own aims: consumer protection, micro-prudence, 
etc., each often at the expense of other agencies and without taking into account the ways that 
different rules may interact with each other. Much of this incoherence would be reduced, and 
stronger conversations across agencies could be created, by forcing them to use a consistent 
BCA protocol. 
 
Avoiding regulatory shopping. On different issues, different regulators are strict to 
different degrees. During the lead-up to the crisis this led to shopping by institutions for the 
regulators that were most favorable and consequent competition by regulators to weaken rules to 
attract regulated parties. This is a particularly worrying issue given the vagueness of definitions 
under Dodd-Frank; derivatives can easily move from being swaps to being securities based on 
minor reclassifications. Forcing all agencies to use consistent standards for judging welfare 
effects of various actions and products would make arbitrage much harder. 
 
Motivating regulators with a sense of mission. Some government agencies have clear 
missions that attract passionate, committed, and highly competent people. The military is an 
obvious example; so is the EPA, which protects people from environmental harm, and the Justice 
Department, which attracts top lawyers who want to make their name sending criminals to jail, 
breaking up cartels, and so on. The financial agencies (perhaps with the exceptions of the Fed 
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) have had less success attracting top talent, 
partly, we suspect, because their mission is less well-defined. Part of the benefit of developing 
principles for a financial BCA is that it will help clarify the nature of bad financial behavior, and 
hence the missions of the financial agencies. 
 
II. BCA and Financial Regulation 
 
 The question now is whether these defenses of BCA, which have largely carried the day 
for other areas of regulation, carry over to financial regulation. We argue that the same 
justifications for standardized, centrally monitored BCA for non-financial regulations apply to 
financial regulation. 
 




 The objections to BCA for financial regulation are diverse. We briefly describe them here 
and our responses. 
 
No welfare standards exist and are accepted in finance. As discussed by Weyl (2013), 
when antitrust analysis first took its economic turn in the late 1970s, empirical analysis of 
mergers and certainly of other anticompetitive conduct was in its infancy. Weyl argues that 
because of the large incentives that the economic-based regime of regulation created for 
consulting services and expert witnesses, a large literature providing details of how to analyze 
these issues grew up.   In follow-on work with James Evans, Weyl is investigating this claim 
empirically.  Similar things are plausibly true of BCA in environmental, health, and safety (EHS) 
regulation. It is hard to imagine how the field of environmental economics could have 
institutionalized itself without the financial support coming from damage assessments and BCAs 
in environmental regulation. Thus it is putting the cart before the horse to suggest that detailed 
empirical methods should exist on these issues when almost no public push has been made to 
create such methods. Evans and Weyl suggest this shift is already starting to occur within finance 
thanks to Dodd Frank and that a strong BCA framework would spur this forward. In the absence 
of BCA, on the other hand, much of this same expertise will be directed to gaming the spirit of 
existing rules on issues like capital, again as documented by Weyl. 
 
Valuations in finance are harder to quantify. Cochrane argues that issues in finance are 
inherently harder to quantify than in other areas. This is far from obvious. Most losses in finance 
are by their nature financial and thus far less controversial and dependent on subjective 
valuations than are issues in EHS regulation. Furthermore, compared to the field of industrial 
organization that underlies the well-developed BCAs in antitrust policy, issues are far less 
industry-specific and fragmented because most financial institutions face basically similar 
market structures and issues. As such, ex-ante, one would think that quantification is easier using 
an economic framework in finance than in these other fields. BCA is particular well-suited to 
areas where centralized expert analysis tends to outperform decentralized, fragmented analysis; 
the question is not how hard quantification is but whether uncoordinated private agents will 
outperform centralized standards. Finance, like medicine (for the reasons we discuss in our other 
paper) seems like an area ideally suited to this because of the lack of subjective idiosyncratic 
valuations and unobserved heterogeneity, as well as the very complexity of the issues involved 
mathematically (as emphasized by Hansen). Finally, models of valuation in finance are far better 
developed than in areas covered by EHS and antitrust regulation, where large components of 
valuation are subjective and require difficult demand estimation. Models of risk-preferences, 
which are the only central subjective component in finance, are far more fully developed. 
 
Analyses will be incomplete and neglect too many relevant issues. As Gordon, and to a 
lesser extent Cochrane, emphasizes, BCA analyses are likely to leave out many of the 
complicated and harder-to-quantify factors that may be important in judging financial regulation. 
This is certainly true, but also applies at least as strongly to EHS and antitrust. The former 
neglects all sorts of quality-of-life effects and the latter neglects crucial dynamic effects on 
innovation that may be even more important than the static effects on which policy typically 
rests; see Weyl and Tirole (2012) on the latter point. However, this is not really an argument 
against BCA; one would have to believe that alternative decision-making procedures would be 
more likely to address these issues and this seems implausible. Forcing explicit accounting for 
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each factor makes clearer what is neglected, not forcing it to be neglected, and stimulates the 
development of methods that allow these to be analyzed, as illustrated by Carpenter’s 
contribution. Absent BCA we would expect more subjective and unaccountable criteria to be 
used in decision-making that would be much more likely to follow a single, inconsistent-across-
agencies consideration (Sunstein, 2000; Kahneman, 2011). 
 
BCA mandates will shut down regulation because of resource burden. Bartlett (this issue) 
and Gordon (this issue) worry that BCA will shut down regulation because BCAs are too 
difficult for agencies to perform. Critics of Business Roundtable have made a similar point. 
However, exactly the same argument was made when President Reagan ordered regulatory 
agencies to perform BCAs in 1981, and thousands of regulations have been issued and approved 
since then. BCA persuaded the Reagan administration to regulate chlorofluorocarbon emissions 
in order to halt the expansion of the ozone hole, and to push for a treaty regime that compelled 
other countries to do the same. Today, BCA has played an important role in climate regulation 
despite the extraordinary uncertainties associated with greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
However, we acknowledge that the standard in Business Roundtable placed too much of 
the burden on the agencies, given their current administrative capacity and funding.  The 
decision presumes that it is the responsibility of the agencies to quantify all factors, including 
potential costs raised by parties, rather than requiring parties to supply evidence for the costs 
they believe should be cognized.  Such burdens are incommensurate to the resources available to 
each side under current agency funding and may also be inconsistent with a reasonable judgment 
of where on average benefits and costs will lie in an individual rule-making.   
 
For example, in the sphere of financial innovation where a strong case can be made that 
most recent advances have been harmful rather than beneficial, we would rather see burdens 
lying with regulated parties.  We have advocated pre-approval regulation of new financial 
derivatives (Posner and Weyl, 2013c) under which an applicant would be required to persuade an 
approval authority that the benefits of an innovation exceeded its costs.  It would be impractical 
and undesirable for burdens to rest primarily on the private sector in all, or even most, other 
matters.  More broadly, though, we believe burdens should be calibrated to mobilize the 
maximum number of analytic resources and reach, on average, the best possible decisions.  In the 
interest of both issues, particularly because of the powerful consulting industry that has 
developed to support private party filings in areas like antitrust, it is unlikely that placing all 
burdens on the agencies is optimal. 
 
None of this, however, speaks to the value of BCA, only to what agents should have the 
responsibility to provide relevant evidence.  Optimally setting burdens on parties and agencies, 
while an important problem, is clearly separable from whether and how BCAs should be 
conducted. 
 
Finance is central to the economy, “social and political,” and “non-stationary.” In a 
recent paper, Coates (2013) offers these reasons against BCA of financial regulation. We are 
skeptical. Coates doesn’t explain why it matters for BCA whether an area of regulation is central 
to the economy or not, but in any event antitrust regulation, which is also central to the economy, 
has been successfully subjected to BCA principles. His next point, which is that financial 
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regulation targets groups of people, while non-financial regulation does not, is wrong. All types 
of regulation target groups of people and must therefore anticipate how those people might 
change their behavior in response to regulation.  In particular, antitrust regulation is profoundly 
political in that it influences the concentration of financial and economic influence and thus the 
ability of firms to effectively coordinate their attempts to lobby the state. Environmental 
regulation not only elicits responses from firms, but environmental organizations like Sierra 
Club, which choose lobbying and litigation strategies based on the regulatory status quo. Finally, 
Coates’ claim that the underlying regularities that financial agencies seek to control are less 
“stationary” or more unstable than the underling regularities that other agencies seek to control 
may well be true; but, if so, this is a problem for regulation, not for BCA. The problem here is 
that investment banks can often easily circumvent regulations by redesigning financial 
instruments—while it is harder to redesign plants in order circumvent environment regulations. 
But if regulation can never block bad behavior but instead just causes bad behavior to take new 
forms, then regulation is a waste of money and should be abandoned. We doubt that Coates 
really takes this view; we don’t.  In any case the degree of such non-stationarity is precisely the 
sort of factor economic analysis is good at quantifying; it underlay, for example, Nobel laureate 
Robert Lucas’s work on econometric forecasting.  Increased work on BCA will improve that 
clarity of debate on this issue as well as others. 
 
B. Principles for BCA of Financial Regulations 
 
 The substance of a regime of financial BCA comes from the core principles that define 
the primary benefits and harms possible from regulation and the private activities that they 
regulate. Once the usually easy-to-quantify compliance costs of regulations are added to these, a 
workable basis for benefit-cost analysis exists. 
 
 We organized our discussion around four fundamental themes that we see as the central 
factors BCA must account for: the externalities of excessive risk-taking by financial institutions, 
the value of information provided by markets, the capacity of markets to either mitigate or 
exacerbate risks, and the benefits and costs of increased credit availability to consumers. In each 
of these areas the conference participants made important contributions both to furthering 
knowledge and distilling the state of the art in the economics literature. We now extract the 
crucial lessons from each paper and formulate them into simple doctrines that can serve as a 
foundation for BCA in practice. 
 
1. Capital and Risk 
 
 Lars Hansen begins the analysis of capital regulations by reinforcing our basic point that 
in complex environments, complex policies are not typically optimal.10 Complex environments 
are often sensitive to over-fitting. Policies and mechanisms accommodated to all the 
complexities of a particular situation are likely to be extremely sensitive to even small changes in 
that setting and most complex environments are not only complex, but highly variable. What is 
needed, therefore, is not complexity but rather robustness. Simple, even naïve, principles that are 
hard to game and perform tolerably well in a wide range of circumstances are actually much 
10 Hansen was unable to publish his paper; our discussion is based on his oral presentation at the conference. 
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more likely to succeed in complex environments than are rules that uses a range of details to fit 
features of a particular set of circumstances.  
 
 John Cochrane builds off of this basic point to highlight a number of the complexities 
that arise in the context of financial regulation and to which policies must be robust. One of these 
is the fact that many existing policies are sub-optimal and often in ways that are inconsistent with 
other existing policies. Interventions that sensitively rely on other policies being set optimally or 
on controlling the full policy environment are unlikely to succeed. Cochrane highlights another 
costs of complex and detailed rules: by raising the costs of compliance they increase barriers to 
entry, leading to consolidation and thus market power. This concentration has several harmful 
effects: it raises prices and reduces efficiency for the standard industrial organization reasons; it 
reduces the collective action problem of the concentrated firms in capturing regulators; and it 
increases the ability of large firms to claim they are too big to fail and thus encourages them 
further to take excessive risk. Cochrane thus emphasizes the importance of identifying and 
focusing on the most central market failures rather than trying to address all potential concerns 
and of establishing clear and consistent standards for evaluating the magnitude of these concerns 
and the extent to which they are addressed or exacerbated by regulations. 
 
 Anat Admati provides a clear account of the nature of the most important market failure 
in finance. The equity holders of banks and their agents have excessive incentives to take on debt 
and other commitments to make payments that risk throwing them into bankruptcy. The reason is 
that the equity holders and usually employees of a bank receive the upside of financial risk, but 
its downside ends up either with bondholders or with governments that feel obliged to aid these 
bond holders to avoid the spread of panic throughout the banking system that could trigger a run 
in the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Because bond holders typically have less say in a 
bank’s governance than do equity holders who have voting rights, this tends to lead banks and 
their agents to act in an inefficiently risk-seeking manner, especially when the government is 
asleep at the wheel in its role of restricting banks behavior. The more indebted a bank becomes, 
the stronger is the incentive to gamble because the larger is the downside absorbed by the 
taxpayer or bond holders relative to the upside absorbed by the owners and employees. That is, 
the larger debt is, the more the bank is gambling with other people’s money.  
 
 This fundamental principle applies not only to debt itself but also to a variety of other 
actions that banks take. For example, offering insurance against another firm’s default by selling 
a credit default swap (CDS) does not sound like leverage, but it exposes the bank to a potentially 
very large loss (based on a commitment to pay) while offering it a small gain. It is particularly 
attractive to a bank’s equity holders and managers to concentrate all such losses into cases when 
the bank will be in default anyway, because in that case they do not bear the loses. Thus the bank 
will have an interest in ensuring that the correlation of their positions is extremely high: 
uncorrelated risks have no value to them, but correlated ones allow them to dump losses onto the 
public. These incentives are precisely the opposite of those that would be pursued by an 
individual attempting to prudently minimize risks while increasing returns and thus the simple 
and perhaps fundamental objective of public policy towards institutions that could potentially 
create a run should be, along a variety of dimensions, to ensure that they behave in a risk-averse 
rather than risk-seeking fashion. Capital regulations, as Admati argues, play an important role in 
achieving this goal, but so do other attempts to reduce speculation and increase insurance in 
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markets, as we discuss in the next section. Thus, regulations that apply to capital and regulations 
that apply to these other activities must be consistent. Benefit-cost principles provide a key way 
of ensuring consistency. 
 
2. Speculation and Insurance in Markets 
 
 Thus banks will tend to have a socially harmful incentive to ignore or even magnify their 
exposure to risk while pursuing maximal returns in the market. A primary dimension along 
which policy should be judged is the ability to limit this dumping of losses onto creditors and the 
state. However, as Gabrielle Gayer, Tzachi Gilboa, Larry Samuelson and David Schmeidler 
argue in their contribution, there are other potentially excessive sources of speculation.  
 
 Many individuals in financial markets effectively gamble with one another based on 
divergent views they hold about the economy and assets within it. Unless it systematically causes 
asset prices to better reflect information that is relevant to economic decisions (more on which in 
the next section), such gambling is a negative-sum game. As Weyl (2007) and Simsek (2013a,b) 
argue, it increases the risk faced by both agents, which is harmful because they are risk averse, 
and can at most benefit one of the agents who makes more money at the expense of the other 
agent. Of course, both individuals in such a bet are consenting adults and restricting them from 
engaging in such a gamble may be viewed as paternalistic, though it is a form of paternalism that 
most societies throughout history have engaged in. Gayer et al. do not argue that such negative-
sum gambles should be counted as a social loss, but they are open to this possibility. However, 
they do argue that such a gamble should not be counted as a social gain, as are trades in the 
market between two individuals who achieve mutual benefit from a trade either by exchanging 
goods and services or by offering insurance to one another against risks they face. Even if one 
does not recognize all loses from such trade, this introduces a sound, economic foundation for a 
fundamental distinction recognized by most lay people between speculative gambling in markets 
and hedging that is used to insure against risks. For an argument that the losses from such 
negative-sum speculation should be counted as social costs to figure in benefit-cost analysis see 
Brunnermeier, Simsek and Xiong (2012).  
  
 In his contribution, Darrell Duffie emphasizes that the externalities of risks in systemic 
institutions and the social costs of negative-sum speculation suggest a basic principle that 
financial regulation should attempt to lean against market forces seeking to increase and 
concentrate risk in the financial system and should view as benefits any role the system can play 
in reducing and diffusing these risks. He argues that the attempt to reduce risk at banks is on 
firmer and clearer philosophical grounds than the potentially paternalistic motives about which 
Gilboa et al. are also ambivalent. Posner and Weyl (2013c) also emphasize that agency problems 
in the monitoring of investments made by professional investment managers may create other 
inappropriate speculative motives. However Duffie highlights that, in practice, much of the 
precise foundation of the benefits of such risk-reduction may be moot because the larger 
difficulty will be informational: determining when various types of trades are risk-increasing 
rather than risk-reducing. The basic difficulty faced by the regulator is that in order to determine 
whether the purchase of a particular asset increases or decreases the risk faced by the purchaser, 




 This empirical difficulty is addressed by Ing-Haw Cheng and Wei Xiong. They 
emphasize that the standard classifications of market participants into the categories of 
“speculators” and “hedgers” by government agencies align very poorly with the economically 
relevant distinction, reducing versus increasing risk, emphasized above. In particular, they use 
transactional data to show that many so-called hedgers in commodity markets appear to take bets 
on prices of commodities that are insensitive to their current exposure, and sensitive to prices, in 
manners that seem inconsistent with risk-averting behavior by net producers and highly 
consistent with taking positional bets based on a view they have about where prices are likely to 
go. Conversely, many “speculators” simply facilitate the genuine insurance hedging behavior of 
market participants over time or across markets. Thus, rather than basing evaluations of hedging 
and speculation behavior on the names agents are given or how they register with agencies, BCA 
of financial regulation should base them on empirical data regarding the agents’ actual positions 
and how their actions are likely therefore to affect their exposure to risk, as emphasized by 
Duffie. However, Cheng and Xiong show how to empirically use information available to the 
agencies to identify behavior that may not be risk-averting and thus is likely to call for regulatory 
action or at least reclassification. Thus, regulators may well be able to overcome some of the 
informational difficulties Duffie raises. 
 
3. Information from Markets and Regulation 
 
 One important source of information that regulators rely on is the markets themselves and 
important potential cost of regulation is impeding this flow of information. Market prices reflect 
a wide range of information gathered by diffuse individuals about future events and regulation 
may limit the ability of individuals to incorporate their information into market prices. 
 
 Eric Budish, Peter Cramton, and John Shim emphasize the dark side of markets’ 
tendency to incorporate information.11 In particular, as emphasized by Hirshleifer (1971), there 
may be excessive incentives to invest in acquiring and incorporating information into prices. 
Individuals continually seek to be faster than other individuals in achieving this goal, even if this 
additional speed does little to benefit actual economic decisions. An individual able to beat 
others to a lucrative piece of information can make a significant arbitrage profit even if there is 
no decision that needs to be made in the interval between the these two individuals affecting the 
market price. These economic decisions are the only reason society gains from this additional 
information and thus any investment in acceleration beyond the horizon of this decision is 
wasteful. Budish et al. focus on a particularly extreme version of this acceleration, where large 
profits can be made based on acceleration at the millisecond level. This allows them to quantify 
the potential waste created by this acceleration of trading and to propose a sensible reform, a 
frequent but not continuous auction, to clear markets efficiently without allowing the high-
frequency race to persist. But the principles and methods they highlight offer a powerful and 
more general method for evaluating the potential profits, and therefore waste, that can arise from 
accelerating the pace of markets beyond what agents making real economic decisions can create 
social value from incorporating into their decisions.  
  
11 As with Hansen, Budish et al. were not able to produce a paper for this volume.  This discussion is based on their 
oral presentation and on their paper, Budish et al. (2013). 
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 Their method is to study the failure of correlation between markets that should move 
closely together (the price of an identical stock or currency in two different cities at the same 
moment, for example) at very short time intervals. This lack of correlation creates a profit 
opportunity from buying the cheaper and selling the more expensive of the two assets. Because 
the time over which these trades occur is so small, any social benefit of incorporating the 
information is likely to be miniscule. Furthermore most of the profits obtained through such 
trading are dissipated through wasteful expenditures to obtain the profits: on computers, on fiber 
links between the cities (hundreds of millions of dollars were spent shortening the Chicago-New 
York connection by milliseconds) and on talented staff. While the Budish et al. analysis applies 
only to these very short-term arbitrages, similar methods could be applied to very small 
arbitrages or very rapid imperfect arbitrages, all of which are unlikely to bring much if any social 
value. Revenue eliminated from these sources should not be counted as a social cost, therefore. 
In fact, an important benefit of regulations that limit frequent and trivial arbitrages is to eliminate 
this revenue so as to avoid the costly waste it encourages. 
 
 If some information acquisition in markets has proved to be a significant cost, Thomas 
Philippon’s contribution emphasizes that many of the claimed benefits of financial innovation 
and arbitrage in creating useful information are illusory. As markets continually accelerate, 
innovative financial products proliferate and arbitrage expands its profitability, Philippon finds 
these activities have brought few or no gains in terms of allowing asset prices to actually predict 
the future more accurately (over time horizons relevant to decision making) and therefore offer 
valuable additional information to businesses and policy-makers. In fact, Philippon finds that as 
the financial sector has increasingly been consuming a larger fraction of GDP it has actually 
grown less efficient in providing capital to business while it has gotten no more accurate in 
predicting future asset prices and therefore allocating capital to the most deserving projects. 
Thus, regulations limiting innovation may not limit the valuable production of information and 
efficient allocation of capital. While Budish et al. show that the costs of excessive information 
acquisition in unregulated markets may be much greater than they appeared, the benefits of 
information acquisition seem likely to be much smaller than they appeared. Thus the benefits of 
regulation aimed at stopping the former and the costs of regulation that unintentionally limits the 
latter are likely larger and smaller than hoped and feared respectively. 
 
 Matt Spitzer and Eric Talley emphasize that not only markets, but regulations themselves 
can bring important information benefits that should be recognized in BCA. New regulations are 
effectively experiments whose outcome provides valuable information to future regulators about 
the effectiveness of various interventions. Thus while one might be concerned that a regulatory 
intervention might limit information flow from the markets, regulators should also take into 
account what they and the markets will learn from trying out new forms of regulation and 
learning about them. Given the limited information that markets appear to provide as discussed 
above, the informational benefits of regulatory experimentation itself may be at least as great as 
the costs of regulation in limiting information flow through the markets. Thus many, especially 
novel, regulatory interventions may actually on net bring a benefit by increasing rather than 
retarding information. This reinforces Weyl’s argument that rigorous, BCA and economics-based 
regulation may stimulate the production of research that is useful for improving such regulation. 
 




 Perhaps the most important other concern about regulation is the limit it can place on the 
supply of credit to consumers and firms. Much regulation prior to the crisis, in fact, as 
emphasized by Cochrane, was actually aimed at increasing access to credit by encouraging risk-
taking behavior by financial institutions. Such a regulatory approach is inconsistent with many of 
the principles outlined above and thus the social value of consumer access to credit is a crucial 
cost to weigh in BCA against the regulatory benefits described above.  
 
 As Jonathan Zinman argues, however, the benefits of additional consumer credit are far 
from clear in existing literature. The most prominent theories of why credit may be under-
supplied rely either on failures of regulation or asymmetric information. Yet as Cochrane 
emphasizes, regulators have bent over backwards to make credit available and significant recent 
evidence indicates that asymmetric information may actually lead to credit being oversupplied 
because of advantageous selection (see, for example, Einav et al., 2012). Much other theory and 
evidence also points to credit being oversupplied. Present bias among consumers may lead them 
to over-borrow, especially for tempting items. Imperfect credit monitoring can create 
externalities across lenders and lead to overleverage of consumers. Deceptive designs of credit 
products may also lead to excessive credit. All of these forces suggest that that, if anything, 
credit supply is likely to be too loose rather than too tight on net. This contrasts sharply with the 
common assumption that credit is undersupplied that underlies much of the analysis justifying 
regulatory actions to subsidize credit. While Zinman highlights some specific, targeted 
interventions that may be useful in correcting the balance of credit in both directions, broad 
interventions to increase credit supply seem unlikely to bring social benefits and may bring some 
social harm. In regulatory actions targeted directly at consumer credit, balancing and estimating 
the broad range of issues Zinman raises is likely to be crucial for determining the benefits and 
costs of policies. However, in other areas of regulation that touch only in an indirect and limited 
way on the supply of credit and are not targeted at specific problems, to a first approximation we 
believe that BCA should disregard any external costs of regulations that limit credit unless 
compelling, case-specific information is available. Of course, costs to firm profits must be taken 
into account, but there does not seem to be significant net external benefit of increasing access to 
credit and thus direct effects on consumer credit should not be considered. 
 
 In areas directly related to the targeted regulation of consumer credit, Sumit Agarwal, 
Souphala Chomsisengphet, Neale Mahoney and Johannes Stroebel take up Zinman’s last point 
about the deceptive design of consumer financial products. Recent regulations have aimed to 
reduce hidden or deceptive fees and many have argued that an unintended cost of such 
regulations may be a “waterbed effect” whereby pushing down these fees interest rates or other 
fees rise in response. They provide a simple theoretical framework that can be used to calculate 
the net consumer welfare effects of fee-reducing regulation in this context. This provides an 
important basis for BCA of such regulations to consider the indirect costs of such regulations. In 
other (Agarwal et al. 2014), they show that in practice one example of such regulation, the 2009 
CARD Act regulating credit, appears to have had almost no significant waterbed effect, leading 
nearly all of the fee reduction to be real rather than just apparent. This suggests that direct 
regulation of consumer financial products to address some of the concerns Zinman raises may 
not have the severe offsetting, unintended consequences that some may have feared. On the other 
hand, beyond the transfer that such regulations create between firms and consumers, which 
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should not typically be counted in a BCA, the only social gain from such regulations is reducing 
the cost of, and therefore increasing access to, credit for consumers. Again we believe that such 
benefits are minimal and thus that they should not be included in BCAs. As a result, we take the 
Agarwal et al. argument as a useful framework and an important structural point about 
regulation, but it does not directly suggest or refute costs that should be included in BCAs. 
 
 On the other hand, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider argue that many more indirect 
approaches to regulation, which were popular especially prior to the crisis, are much more costly, 
especially compared to direct regulation, than was thought. Ben-Shahar and Schneider argue that 
disclosure regulations, which have often been thought to be a particularly safe form of regulation 
because they merely inform consumers rather than restrict their behavior, are often 
counterproductive because they overload consumers with information that leads them to 
disregard even more valuable information. Ben-Shahar and Schneider argue that this tax on 
consumers’ attention and thus on the amount of information from other sources absorbed, should 
be recognized as a cost of mandated disclosures. Because disclosures are, like the information 
produced by markets, useful only if they actually lead to changes in behavior, disclosures may be 
over-produced not just under-produced by the market and certainly by naïve regulators focused 
on consumer sovereignty rather than good decision-making. Together the Agarwal et al. piece 
and the Ben-Shahar and Schneider piece suggest that direct restrictions on consumer products or 
nudges that are easy for consumers to process may be much more valuable than are tools for 
“consumer empowerment” that are likely to be ignored. Furthermore the severe limitations they 
emphasize on consumer cognitive capacity reinforce Zinman’s message that consumer credit is if 
anything likely to be over-supplied.12 This in turn reinforces the fundamental principle we have 
emphasized throughout: that BCA should focus on measuring the benefits regulations bring in 
increasing the extent to which agents throughout the financial sector act like rational risk-
averters. 
 
C. Goals for Implementation 
 
 Thus we can distill the message coming out of all the papers as follows: 
 
1. It is crucial in a complex world for regulation to be based on simple and robust 
principles. The most fundamental of these is that agents taking on risk in the financial 
sector often causes externalities. In particular, two external harms are most prominent: 
the fact that losses in states of default are likely to be absorbed by taxpayers, rather than 
agents controlling the firm, and thus should be counted as social loss; and the fact that 
such losses may lead to a disorderly bankruptcy precipitating a run in the case a bailout 
cannot be arranged quickly enough. A primary goal of BCA for financial regulation 
should be to quantify the impact of any regulation on the expected losses in bailout states 
and the probability of such losses triggering a crisis. The latter of which must be 
multiplied by the social loss associated with the crisis as we discuss in Posner and Weyl 
(2013b). 
12 We are thus skeptical that BCA should take into account loss-of-confidence and innovation costs in the consumer 




                                                 
2. Agents, driven by differences in beliefs, may also engage in speculation that is, at least in 
aggregate, socially wasteful. Such speculation should at least not be counted as a benefit 
of allowing markets to operate unfettered simply because there is demand for it and there 
is a strong argument to be made that it should be treated as a cost that regulation can help 
eliminate. Empirical strategies for measuring such increase in risk are available based on 
the behavior that would be expected from a rational risk-averse agent. Sound economic 
models, rather than historical classifications, should be used to determine the extent and 
size of zero- or negative-sum speculation. 
3. The reduction in information supplied by markets as a result of regulation is likely to be 
minimal and may even be beneficial and there are potential informational benefits of 
experimenting with new regulation. Reductions in revenue from extremely short-lived or 
small arbitrages should not be allowable costs in BCA as they create little or no social 
value. Regulations that eliminate the cost of creating such revenue will thus tend to be 
desirable. 
4. The other potential concern, the reduction of credit to consumers, may actually be a 
benefit. Thus, while direct losses of profits created by regulations that end up restricting 
credit should be recognized and the reduction in credit itself should not be counted as a 
benefit, neither should reduction in consumer credit count as a cost in most BCAs except 
targeted regulations that are directly designed to address clearly-measured market 
failures. Direct and targeted regulation of this credit supply seems likely to outperform 
indirect regulation via disclosure or aggregate increases in credit availability.  
 
 These principles provide a clear, simple and coherent paradigm for financial regulation in 
much the same way that the trade-off between life and health versus productivity does for EHS 
regulation and that the trade-off between anti-competitive agreements and efficiency-enhancing 
economies of scale do in antitrust. While these other regulatory regimes consider a wide range of 
additional costs and benefits, as we also believe BCA for financial regulation should (as 
discussed above), all focus on central factors and deemphasize other considerations (such as 
quality-of-life benefits in EHS regulation and impacts on dynamic entry into the industry in 
antitrust). The goal is to simplify regulation, so that regulators can manage it and regulated 
entities can predict it. 
 
So too in BCA for financial regulation, in each area of financial regulation the primary 
emphasis in the BCA should be on a specific trade-off that is central to that area. For regulation 
of banks and other systemically important financial institutions, regulation should focus on the 
trade-off between the benefits of risk-reduction for these institutions and the costs of reduced 
profits, with the other potential benefits of regulation deemphasized. For regulation of high-
speed trading, the focus should be on information externalities. For regulation of new 
derivatives, the focus should typically be on the social costs of speculation. And for consumer 
protection, the focus should be on the risks of undersupply of credit to consumers, although, as 
we have seen, we suspect these risks are typically low. 
 
 The key step is to institutionalize these principles, which we discuss in Part III. 
 
 




 To illustrate the practical implications of our conclusions, we now briefly consider how 
an analysis of the benefits and costs of a stylized version of the Volcker Rule banning proprietary 
trading by banks might proceed. Costs would be straightforward to compute. They would simply 
be the profits, net of all generated costs (labor, site, capital investments, etc.) earned by the 
relevant banks’ proprietary trading groups in an average year. This average could be determined 
using historical data. 
 
 The two primary benefits of such a rule would be 1) the reduction in losses in states of 
the world where the bank had to be bailed out and thus the losses were absorbed by the taxpayer 
and 2) the increase in the chance that a collapse could occur before a bailout could be arranged, 
causing an economic crisis such as the one triggered by Lehmann Brothers’ collapse. The first 
benefit should be judged on the basis of a financial model employing historical data. The 
simplest metric for calibration would be the amount of losses, at the bottom of the market in late 
2008, that resulted from banks’ proprietary trading operations. All of these losses were 
essentially absorbed by TARP, at least when valued at the market prices during the slump. 
Eventually TARP and other government policies managed a sufficient recovery that the losses 
actually became gains, but losses should be valued at market prices at the time of the loss. These 
losses, passed on to the government in this default state, must be multiplied by the hazard rate of 
such a state on an annualized basis to compare them against annualized profits on the benefit side 
from proprietary trading. This hazard rate can again be estimated from historical data, 
particularly the data collected by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).  Note that netting out these 
publicly-absorbed losses eliminates the subsidy to the firm from the net costs of the regulation 
and thus does not illegitimately count profits that derive only from this subsidy as a cost of the 
regulation.  Only profits net of this implicit subsidy (profits arising from inherent 
complementarities between proprietary trading and market making, for example) count as costs 
and if profits are less than the implicit subsidy the rule will be net beneficial.  
 
 The chance of an actual failure that is not bailed out successfully can be judged based on 
credit default swaps currently traded in the market and the effect of reductions in proprietary 
trading that have occurred historically (for various reasons such as take-over bids or internal 
reorganizations) on these. Event studies in the markets, based on changes in the CDS values 
when new leadership came to banks either from a position within the firm in proprietary trading 
or from a more conservative part of the bank less likely to engage in proprietary trading would 
be valuable. So too would evaluations of changes in the chance of default based on financial 
models of the distribution of payoffs in proprietary trading. These would generate an impact of 
the proprietary trading ban on the chance of a unsupported default. Then the impact of such an 
unsupported default on the chance of a crisis would have to be estimated. Again historical data 
would be useful here. A reference class of defaults of banks of similar size relative to the 
economy as a whole could be formed in the Reinhardt and Rogoff data and from it calculated the 
chance of such a disorderly bankruptcy triggering a crisis could be calculated. This in turn would 
be multiplied by the social cost of a crisis. In Posner and Weyl (2013b) we argue that $1-2 
trillion for the social cost of a crisis is appropriate. 
 
Coates (2013) argues that our other studies cast doubt on this figure by a large margin.  
The numbers that Coates cites as credible range up to $300 trillion, based on a hypothetical 
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discussion by the Bank of England’s governor Andrew Haldane.  While there is clearly 
significant room for debate on these issues, treating hypothetical upper bounds that are meant for 
the purposes of illustration as serious estimates obviously exaggerates greatly the range of 
uncertainty.  $300 trillion is more than half of the world’s wealth (Piketty and Zucman, 2014) or 
the equivalent of 30 million American lives at standard statistical value of human life.  It seems 
almost impossible to imagine that the cost of this crisis is of this magnitude.  Reasoning seriously 
about these numbers in this manner makes much clearer what assumptions are needed to justify 
the Volker Rule or its removal.  The same is true for other key parameters, such as the chance of 
a potential default requiring a bailout as discussed above: probabilities that are much greater or 
much less than the roughly 2% per year emerging from the Reinhardt and Rogoff analysis are 
inconsistent with the number of crises over the last several hundred years at a high level of 
statistical significance. 
 
 The basic calculation would weigh these two benefits of eliminating proprietary trading 
from the banks’ balance sheets against the cost to profits. A number of subsidiary benefits 
discussed above should also be analyzed in a more superficial way. Revenue earned in 
proprietary trading that is extremely short-term or based on large volumes of very small 
arbitrages should be heavily discounted or simply subtracted entirely from the cost to account for 
wasteful racing and informational arbitrage. Some effort might be made to weigh the costs of 
reducing insurance provision and benefits of reducing gambling facilitation to counterparties 
with which the bank’s proprietary traders interact; however we suspect these would be 
quantitatively small compared with the main benefits and costs. 
 
 Finally, second-order, ripple effects should also be given some weight. Expenditures by 
banks to evade the rule and costs of enforcing it should be estimated; these should be divided by 
the probability that the rule will actually accomplish its goals, because if it does not then the 
enforcement costs will be magnified relative to the net gain from the rule having its intended 
effect. Costs from related speculative activity flowing to other unregulated institutions should be 
considered.   Benefits of simplified resolution of the bank in the case it is not liquidated should 
be recognized based on recent experiences with firms like Lehmann Brothers. 
 
 As Coates notes, the valuations needed to perform this BCA are not easily determined. 
Existing studies are sparse; data are often scarce; and, because financial markets change rapidly, 
historical patterns can be only roughly predictive of future behavior. Regulators would need to 
fund additional studies before they could do high-quality BCAs, and so in the interim would 
need to rely largely on informed guesswork.   
 
However, simply quantifying guesswork itself is likely to prove highly informative and to 
indicate where future research is most useful.  Even if we accept the wide ranges of uncertainty 
Coates attributes to the cost of a crisis, it is possible that the Volcker Rule is justified even at the 
low end of this range.  In this case, we would have learned that this uncertainty is not germane to 
the BCA of the Volcker Rule and that it should be approved in any case.  It is also possible that 
the change in this parameter makes all the difference and thus new research in this area would be 
of particularly high value.  Despite the extent of very great uncertainty about the statistical value 
of a human life, for example (ranging from just over a million dollars to tens of millions of 
dollars for a median income American; see Viscusi and Aldi, 2003) even limiting it to this range 
21 
 
has been powerful in eliminating some wasteful regulations and ensuring other beneficial ones 
overcome opposition.  We expect the same to be true of key parameters in financial regulation. 
 
 
III. Institutionalizing Financial BCA 
 
 If we can provide financial regulators with several protocols or blueprints for conducting 
financial BCAs, we will have made a great deal of progress. Simply drawing their attention to 
the relevant benefits and costs, and giving them a rough guide for calculating them, is a start. But 
we cannot expect financial regulators to produce high-quality BCAs of financial regulations 
unless they are given proper incentives and institutional support. 
 
 Regulators tend to do what they have done in the past unless given a strong external push 
to act differently. It was not until President Reagan issued his executive order in 1981 that the 
non-financial agencies took BCA seriously. Business Roundtable may well push financial 
regulators to conduct better BCAs, but so far the evidence is not encouraging. More likely, 
regulators will use indirect methods to regulate (for example, interpretive guidance) that evades 
judicial review, or possibly just stop regulating in certain areas.13 And, as we have seen, some 
types of regulations are not subject to the heightened scrutiny illustrated by that case. 
 
 We can see two possible methods for encouraging regulators to use BCA. First, Congress 
could pass a law requiring that they do so. Such a bill has in fact been proposed by Senator 
Shelby. We are nervous about such an approach for reasons given by Bartlett (this issue): judicial 
enforcement of BCA is premature given the very limited knowledge so far as to how BCA of 
financial regulations should be conducted. Second, the president could issue a new executive 
order that requires financial regulators to conduct BCAs and backing it up with meaningful 
threats to block regulations that fail BCAs. However, it is not clear that the president has the 
legal authority to do this. Moreover, since he cannot fire regulators at independent agencies, it is 
not clear that an executive order would affect behavior as emphasized by Bartlett. Perhaps a 
combination of these approaches, in which OIRA was legislatively given some authority to reject 
BCAs that were not up to standard even at independent agencies, would be desirable. 
 
 Regulators can also be encouraged with better institutional support. Here, we believe that 
clear progress can be made. One possible approach is for the president to create a department 
within OIRA and give it the specific mission of coordinating BCA among the financial agencies. 
Working with the financial regulators, this department would draft a protocol for conducting 
benefit-cost analysis of financial regulations, analogous to OMB Circular A-4. The protocol 
would include common valuations, as discussed above, plus best practices for gathering data, 
using peer review, discounting, presenting information, and so on. 
 
 Another possible approach is for the president to order the Office of Financial Research 
to conduct these tasks. The OFR is a new office in Treasury; it was created by the Dodd-Frank 
Act. Its mission is to “improve the quality of financial data available to policymakers and to 
facilitate more robust and sophisticated analysis of the financial system.”14 Clearly, OFR could 
13 See CFTC press release 2013. 
14 http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ofr/about/Pages/default.aspx.  
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fund studies so as to improve valuations needed for financial BCRs, and it could help financial 




 This paper lays out a framework and research program for improving benefit-cost 
analysis of financial regulations. Financial regulators can use this framework as a basis for 
collaboratively producing benefit-cost protocols, and for funding peer-reviewed research into 
valuations that are recurrently used in regulatory analysis. 
 
 While this paper was in process, John Coates (2013) released a working paper that is 
highly critical of BCA of financial regulations. We responded to some of his criticisms in Part 
II.B. Here we want to address his major argument, based on his case studies, which is that 
regulators should do “conceptual” BCAs but not “quantified” BCAs because the relevant 
valuations are too difficult to determine. Our view is that his case studies just show that 
economists have not yet spent enough time estimating valuations. As we argued before, if 
regulators were required to engage in BCA, they would be forced to pay for more studies, and 
economists would have incentives to conduct more of them. The fact that there are currently only 
limited studies means very little, only that financial BCA is at an early stage today, just as 
antitrust and environmental BCAs were at an early stage in the 1970s. 
 
 We also see very little difference between “conceptual BCA” and “quantified BCA.” 
Quantified BCA just is conceptual BCA with the numbers filled in where they exist—and it is 
almost always true that some relevant numbers exist (such as compliance costs) even when all do 
not. Furthermore conceptual BCA almost always implicitly uses numerical bounds: if the cost of 
a crisis were really, as Coates suggests it might be, on the order of hundreds of trillions or even 
quadrillions of dollars, any regulation that had any chance of reducing a crisis no matter how 
costly would be desirable.  A “conceptual” BCA rejecting this conclusion must implicitly be 
rejecting these preposterously large numbers.  Furthermore even if financial regulators used 
conceptual BCA, that would be a radical advance over current practice. Thus, we see Coates as 
more a supporter than critic of financial BCAs. The major question is how to force regulators to 
gather more data and do more rigorous analysis. We agree with Coates that judicial review may 
be an excessively clumsy instrument for providing such an incentive. But we believe that there is 
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